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Abstract: The sharp decline in house prices since 2007 has led to the emergence of 
widespread negative equity in Ireland. For a large sample of borrowers in negative 
equity the paper provides details on the characteristics of the borrowers and their 
mortgages by analysing loans taken out to purchase a primary residence in the 
period 2005 to 2012. The emergence of negative equity is not just about price drops. 
Loan characteristics such as the loan-to-value ratio and the length of the mortgage 
term also have a role to play.  The analysis finds the situation in Ireland to be much 
more severe than that being experienced in other housing market downturns at 
present, with 64 per cent of borrowers from the period 2005-2012 in negative 
equity. Analysis by age gives rise to concern, with the majority of those in negative 
equity aged under 40 years. Traditionally, this is the age group most active in the 
housing market. The paper also points to the large wealth loss, in the order of €43 
billion, experienced by Irish households as a result of the fall in prices. With only 
moderate house price growth expected in the years ahead there is a generation of 
mortgage borrowers whose housing market experience will have been 
overwhelmingly negative and who will remain in negative equity for some time.  
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Negative equity in Ireland: Estimates using Loan Level Data 
1. Introduction 
The sharp decline in residential property prices since 2007 has led to the emergence of 
widespread negative equity in Ireland. Indeed, the incidence appears to be much worse than 
has been experienced in other economies. Negative equity occurs when the price of a 
property falls below the value of the outstanding mortgage secured on that property. As 
well as impacting on the financial wellbeing of households affected, it can also have 
implications for financial stability and even monetary policy (Hellebrandt et al. 2009). 
Early estimates for Ireland have had to use aggregate published data to estimate the total 
number of borrowers affected and the total value of negative equity1. For example, Duffy 
(2010) estimated that there were 196,000 borrowers in negative equity at the end of 2010. 
In recent times a number of different loan level datasets have become available, enabling a 
micro analysis of the issue; for example, see Kennedy and McIndoe-Calder (2011). This paper 
aims to extend the existing analysis of those in negative equity by providing further detail on 
the characteristics of borrowers and of their mortgages by analysing loans taken out to 
purchase a primary residence in the period 2005 to 2012. We look at who have negative 
equity and the extent of that negative equity.  
As negative equity has become more widespread, many of its wider effects impact on the 
economy via the indebted home owner. Households in negative equity may consume less as 
they feel less wealthy but also feel that they no longer have access to funds through housing 
equity (Disney et al. 2010). In an Irish context, Gerlach-Kristen (2013) finds that the extent of 
negative equity in Ireland is having an impact on consumption, particularly by younger 
households. Negative equity is also associated with lower mobility in the housing market 
(Henley, 1998, Ferreira et al., 2008, Gyourka and Siaz, 2003).2 It is also associated with 
mortgage default, although by itself negative equity does not cause problems repaying a 
mortgage (Foote et al., 2008, 2009). However, Ghent and Kudlyak (2010), examining 
mortgage defaults across US states with both recourse and non-recourse3 borrowing, find 
that recourse borrowing decreases the probability of default, even if the borrower is in 
negative equity. 
The on-going debate as to what measures can be taken to assist struggling mortgage holders 
can be informed by greater detail about those in negative equity. It is important to 
understand who has been affected and how they have been affected. Other papers show 
the role that mortgage characteristics have on the likelihood of being in negative equity. This 
                                                          
1 For example, Duffy, 2010, and Lyons 2010.  Thomas, 1996, discusses the different methods for 
estimating negative equity.  
2 However, there is some debate about this finding in a paper by Schulhofer-Wohl (2010). 
3 Non-recourse debt is a debt secured by a pledge of collateral but for which the borrower is not 
personally liable. If the borrower defaults, the lender can seize the collateral, but the lender's 
recovery is limited to the collateral. 
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paper adds to the existing analysis by showing who has negative equity – in different 
regions, different age-groups, by year of purchase and by initial loan-to-value ratio. Knowing 
who has negative equity helps to understand where we might find reduced consumption 
and household mobility. 
The emergence of negative equity is not just about price drops. Loan characteristics such as 
the initial loan-to-value ratio and the length of the mortgage term also have a role to play. 
As part of our analysis we examine not only how these characteristics contribute to negative 
equity but also how have changed since the peak of the market.  We find that loan terms 
and loan-to-value ratios have fallen as access to credit becomes tighter.  
The paper is structured as follows: in the next section we provide details of the dataset on 
which the analysis is based. Section 3 examines the evolution of the Irish housing and 
mortgage market over the course of the boom and bust. In Section 4 we set out how we 
estimate negative equity, and in Section 5 we examine the incidence of negative equity and 
the role played by mortgage characteristics. In Section 6 we analyse the characteristics of 
borrowers in negative equity. Section 7 estimates the negative wealth effect caused by the 
fall in Irish house prices, while Section 8 provides an estimate of the number of households 
in negative equity. Section 9 presents our concluding comments.  
 
2. The Dataset 
The data are drawn from monthly mortgage returns submitted by eight of the main 
mortgage lenders in Ireland to the Department of Environment, Heritage and Local 
Government (DoEHLG) under the Housing (Miscellaneous Provisions) Act of 2002 and to the 
Central Statistics Office. Unfortunately data is not available for two lenders who were 
prominent in the Irish market during the early period under observation. The returns contain 
data on both mortgage approvals (occurring where a formal letter of mortgage offer has 
issued) and mortgage drawdowns (where the loan has been drawn down – i.e. the 
transaction completed). The data should consist of an individual record for every loan 
approval and loan drawdown made by the lender in the reference month. However in 
practice not all mortgages are reported either because certain banks did not report or 
reporting banks did not provide usable records for every drawdown.  
This study is confined to mortgages for the purchase of primary residences only. These 
mortgages accounted for just over 50 per cent of all mortgages drawdown between 2005 
and 2012. Mortgage top-ups, mortgages for investment or second homes and mortgages for 
the purchase of local authority housing are excluded. It is likely that a significant number of 
these mortgages are also affected by negative equity; however they are outside the scope of 
this study.  
The data are anonymised – neither the individual borrower nor the property purchased can 
be directly identified. The variables used for this study, which include detail on the 
borrower(s), mortgaged property and the loan characteristics are set out at Appendix I.  
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The original dataset used for this study covers the period January 2005 to December 2012 
and amounted to almost 165,700 individual records, representing almost 50 per cent of the 
value and volume of the overall mortgage market for primary residences, as reported by the 
Irish Banking Federation. The purchase price of property was clearly recorded incorrectly in a 
small number of cases. A simple threshold edit on purchase prices could not be applied 
however as the highly heterogeneous nature of residential property means that large 
variations in prices between different property times are expected. Instead, erroneous 
values for the purchase price of properties were identified by using a simple regression of 
the log of price against year of purchase, region of property, house or apartment, new or 
second hand property and buyer type (first time, assisted, previous owner). Records with 
very large studentized residuals were excluded from the subsequent analysis. This amounted 
to just over 800 records (or 0.5%). A further 0.5% of records were removed due to spurious 
values for loan terms and very implausible relationships between loan terms and the age 
profile of borrowers. A number of other edits were imposed. After data cleaning and taking 
account of the exclusions outlined above the final dataset for our analysis amounted to over 
162,500 cases. 
 
3. The Evolution of the Irish Housing/Mortgage Market 
Accompanying Ireland’s economic boom the Irish housing market grew significantly over the 
period 1997 to 2007. This growth, apart from a short interruption in 2001, is reflected not 
only in house prices but also in other indicators. For example, Department of Environment 
statistics show that the number of mortgage loans paid in a single year rose to over 111,000 
in 2006, compared to a level of around 57,000 in 1996. Between 2000 and 2008 over 
760,700 mortgages were issued. Accompanying this was a large increase in the level of 
residential mortgage debt outstanding, from close to €14 billion in December 1996 to nearly 
€148 billion in December 2008.4  
The housing market boom also saw financial product development which encouraged or 
facilitated homeownership. Tracker mortgages were introduced5. Mortgage products with 
terms longer than the traditional 20 years were introduced. Loan-to-value (LTV) ratios6 
began to increase and borrowers were able to access 100 per cent mortgages compared to 
the previous maximum of 92 per cent for most borrowers. Interest only mortgages were also 
introduced. Finally, lenders began to target the subprime mortgage sector. Lending criteria 
moved from income multiples to a limit based on the ratio of mortgage service cost to 
income. Addison-Smyth et al, (2009) model the availability of mortgage credit and find 
                                                          
4 Central Bank data, level of mortgage debt outstanding adjusted for securitisation. 
5 Mortgages where the interest charged equals the main ECB refinancing rate plus a premium set at 
inception. 
6 Mortgage value as a percentage of property value at the inception of the mortgage contract. 
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evidence of excess credit7 in the Irish market, especially since 2004, contributing to the rise 
in house prices. Ellis (2008a) attributes some of the blame for the rise in the number of 
borrowers in negative equity to the easing of lending standards that occurred there. 
The current situation is now very different to the experience of the boom. House prices have 
declined substantially, mortgage lending volumes are now much lower and credit conditions 
have been tightened. In addition, housing market activity has been adversely affected by 
income cuts, higher taxation and rising unemployment.  
According to Ellis (2008b) the characteristics of the borrowers mortgage have an important 
role in determining if they end up in negative equity, with negative equity depending on: 
• initial equity, determined by the LTV ratio;  
• the equity built up by housing price appreciation between the start of the mortgage 
and the peak of housing prices; 
• any reduction in principal via repayment since the loan was taken out. 
In addition the repayment type determines how quickly the principal is repaid. Ellis (2008a) 
argues that, in part, the depth of the housing downturn in the US was caused by an easing of 
lending standards. This included the use of second mortgages, (resulting in higher overall 
LTV ratios), higher initial LTV ratios on new mortgages, and the availability of 100 per cent 
mortgages. Furthermore, the introduction of interest only8 mortgages meant that not only 
were initial LTV ratios high, but they stayed high on an ongoing basis. Looking at these 
variables for the dataset points to the role these variables may have played in an Irish 
context. Table 1 shows the distribution of LTVs by year of mortgage drawdown. 
 
                                                          
7 Excess credit is considered to occur when the actual mortgage level is above the long-run mortgage 
level. 
8 An interest only mortgage means that the borrower does not repay any of the principal but instead 
just pays the interest due. Typically for this type of mortgage a borrower would have an interest only 
period at the commencement of the mortgage, say for 3 years, after which they would then begin to 
repay both interest and capital. 
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Table 1: Distribution of Loan-to-Value ratios by year of mortgage drawdown 
 
LTV 
<=50% 
LTV 50-
60% 
LTV 60-
70% 
LTV 70-
80% 
LTV 80-
90% 
LTV 90-
100% 
LTV 
>=100 
 
% % % % % % % 
2005 18.3 7.6 8.2 10.1 17.0 36.5 2.2 
2006 17.8 6.6 7.5 9.5 13.8 42.8 2.0 
2007 19.4 7.2 7.7 9.2 13.1 41.0 2.4 
2008 17.5 6.3 7.5 9.3 13.9 42.3 3.1 
2009 13.0 5.4 6.7 10.1 17.7 44.4 2.7 
2010 11.5 5.1 6.6 10.4 23.3 40.4 2.8 
2011 16.4 4.8 7.3 11.2 24.6 32.9 2.8 
2012 13.1 5.3 7.3 14.0 32.8 24.6 3.0 
Source: Own estimates based on CSO data 
 
Analysis of the data shows that median loan-to-value ratios rose from 85 per cent in 2005 to 
89 per cent in the following year. Median loan to value ratios of 90 per cent persisted into 
2009 and 2010, despite rapidly falling prices. This appears to be the result of higher LTV 
ratios for repeat buyers who, at a time when house prices were declining and the overall 
housing market was weak, may have been taking out higher mortgages to compensate for 
lower housing equity. However, median LTV ratios declined to 87 per cent in 2011, and have 
stabilized around this level, possibly reflecting tighter credit conditions.  
Apart from during 2005, a substantial proportion of mortgages were taken out with a 31-35 
year term, accounting for approximately 40 per cent or over of mortgages drawn down in 
each year between 2006 and 2010. Longer term mortgages generally mean that the principal 
is being repaid at a slower pace, reducing the equity the borrower is accumulating in their 
dwelling.  Again the data may point to the changing nature of the Irish housing market, with 
the traditional 20 year mortgage term increasing as a proportion of mortgages drawn down 
in 2011 such that it surpassed that recorded in 2005. At the other extreme, the proportion of 
mortgages drawn down with a term greater than 30 years has fallen from 43 per cent in 
2010 to 30 per cent in 2011 and under 28 per cent in 2012. 
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Table 2: Initial mortgage term by year of drawdown, % of mortgages each year 
  2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 
   
% of mortgages each year 
 
 
<= 20 yrs 20.3 15.0 16.8 15.8 15.8 15.9 21.8 22.0 
21-25 yrs 22.2 16.1 15.6 15.9 16.0 16.8 19.3 21.5 
26-30 yrs 31.7 29.3 23.4 22.8 24.4 24.1 29.1 28.7 
31-35 yrs 25.8 39.6 44.0 40.2 40.9 42.0 29.8 27.8 
36 yrs + 0.0 0.0 0.2 5.2 2.9 1.2 0.1 0 
Total 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 
Source: Own estimates based on CSO data 
 
When the mortgage was drawn down can also affect whether or not the borrower is in 
negative equity. Just over 65 per cent of the mortgages in our sample were taken out before 
peak of the CSO Residential Property Price Index in September 2007. 
 
Figure 1: Irish house prices and distribution of mortgages by year of drawdown 
 
Source: Own estimates based on CSO data 
 
4. How we estimate negative equity 
Negative equity occurs when the value of a property falls below the balance of the mortgage 
secured against the property.  Thus, in order to determine if a borrower is experiencing 
negative equity we need to estimate the current value of the property and the current 
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mortgage balance. The dataset provides a substantial amount of information on the loan 
taken out by the individual. For example, the type of mortgage, the initial interest rate and 
the type of interest rate, as well as the initial loan amount and the month of mortgage 
drawdown. This enables us to calculate the remaining balance at the end of 2012 using a 
standard annuity formula: 
R=P[i(1+i)n]/[(1+i)n-1] 
where R is the mortgage repayment, P is the initial loan amount, i is the mortgage interest 
rate, and n is the mortgage term.  
In doing so we have to make a number of assumptions. Firstly, while we have the initial 
interest rate we do not have details of the interest rate path followed by the mortgage. 
Therefore we assume that the interest rate for subsequent months is the representative 
mortgage interest rate as published by the Central Statistics Office. For those on fixed 
mortgages once the fixed term finishes we assume that the mortgage reverts to a standard 
variable rate mortgage, again using the representative mortgage interest rate as published 
by the CSO. We assume that borrowers are making full payments, there are no arrears and 
borrowers have not released any equity from their property as the available dataset does 
not have information on the repayment history of borrowers. Research using an alternative 
loan level dataset for the Irish mortgage market shows that of the mortgage properties 
found to be in negative equity, 8 per cent had also accrued more than three months worth 
of arrears on their mortgage books, (Kennedy and McIndoe-Calder 2012). In addition it is 
worth noting that Central Bank data on mortgage restructuring shows that in December 
2011, 79,852 mortgages had been restructured, 10.1 per cent of the total number of 
residential mortgage loans outstanding (Central Bank, 2013).  
In addition to ensuring the loan balance is updated we must also estimate the current value 
of the property (to end of 2012). This is done using three indices from the CSO Residential 
Property Price Index. Properties with an address outside Dublin are estimated using the CSO 
National excluding Dublin Housing Price Index, Dublin housing are estimated using the CSO 
Dublin House Price Index and Dublin Apartments are estimated using the CSO Dublin 
Apartments Price Index. Figure 2 shows the declines that have been experienced by these 
three property types to the end of 2012, with properties outside Dublin down by nearly 46 
per cent from peak, Dublin houses by just over 54 per cent and Dublin apartments by over 
62 per cent.  
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Figure 2: Residential property price trends in Ireland, 2005 to end-2012 
 
Source: CSO, Residential Property Price Index 
 
5. The Incidence of Negative Equity 
We can estimate the numbers who are in negative equity from the pool of borrowers who 
took out mortgages for primary residential properties between the beginning of 2005 and 
the end of 2012. This is done by weighting the loan level data to the total number of 
mortgages for purchases of primary residences as reported by the Irish Banking Federation.  
Our analysis suggests that approximately 214,000 mortgages drawn down since 2005 are in 
negative equity. This estimate is higher than some other estimates that have been published 
for the Irish market using alternative loan level data. Our higher estimate probably reflects a 
number of factors. The data set used to produce this current estimate is for the period 
immediately prior to the peak in house prices and the subsequent crash, i.e. from 2005 to 
2012. Other estimates calculate negative equity as a proportion of the stock of all 
outstanding mortgages and so would include mortgages drawn down before 2005. In 
addition, our estimates are based on a period when the Irish mortgage market experienced 
competition and product innovation, for example the introduction of interest only 
mortgages or mortgages with a 100 per cent loan-to-value ratio.  
The data allows us to examine the different key factors outlined above that contribute to the 
incidence of negative equity as well as provide some insights into who is experiencing 
negative equity. 
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The Role played by Timing of Purchase 
A key factor is when the property was purchased, in other words how close to the peak in 
property prices did the buyer take out a mortgage. Figure 3 shows the proportion of 
mortgages in negative equity by the year in which they were drawn down. Those who 
borrowed towards the end of the boom and close to the peak in house prices are more likely 
to be experiencing negative equity, with 70 per cent or over of mortgages drawn down in 
each year between 2006 and 2009 in negative equity. The extent of house price falls means 
that some mortgages taken out since the downturn are in negative equity, for example, over 
67 per cent of those drawn down in 2010 and over 34 per cent of mortgages drawn down in 
2011 were already in negative equity by the end of 2011. The slower pace of price decline in 
2012, coupled with some month-on-month increases in the latter half of the year means 
that just 4 per cent of mortgages drawn down in 2012 were in negative equity by the end of 
the year. In the UK negative equity cases are more concentrated in one year, 2007, with 
nearly 30 per cent of mortgages in negative equity drawn down in 2007, while mortgages 
drawn down in 2006 and 2008 each account for between 10-15 per cent of cases, (Purdey 
2011). 
 
Figure 3: Mortgages in Negative Equity by Year of Drawdown 
 
Source: Own estimates based on CSO data 
 
Figure 4 shows the cumulative numbers in negative equity as a proportion of the cumulative 
mortgages drawn down. The incidence of negative equity increased substantially between 
the beginning of 2008 and the second half of 2009. The numbers of those experiencing 
negative equity continued to rise, although the pace of the increase is not as rapid. The 
Residential Property Price Index records some monthly price increases in the latter half of 
2012, leading to a decline in the proportion of mortgages in negative equity. By our 
estimates, the proportion peaked at over 66 per cent in February 2012 and by end 2012 had 
declined marginally to 64 per cent. 
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Figure 4: Numbers in negative equity, cumulative January 2005 – December 2012,  
as a % of cumulative mortgages drawdown to that date 
 
Source: Own estimates based on CSO data 
 
The Impact of the Initial Loan-to-Value ratio 
In Figure 5 we show the distribution of mortgages and the distribution of borrowers who 
purchased between January 2005 and December 2012 who are in negative equity in 
December 2012 distributed by their initial loan-to-value ratio. Unsurprisingly, borrowers 
with higher initial loan-to-value ratios are more likely to have negative equity, as found by 
Ellis (2008a) using US mortgage data. The depth of the housing market decline is such that, 
based on the data available to us, a small proportion of mortgages with an initial LTV of 50 
per cent or less are now in negative equity.  
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Figure 5: Distribution of mortgages and negative equity by initial loan-to-value ratio, %. 
 
Source: Own estimates based on CSO data 
 
The Influence of Mortgage Term 
The pace at which the mortgage is repaid is at least in part determined by the mortgage 
term. Mortgages with a longer term repay the principal at a slower pace. Figure 6 shows the 
distribution of borrowers in negative equity by the length of the original mortgage. Nearly 
50 per cent of those in negative equity have a mortgage term between 31 and 35 years. The 
role that mortgage term plays is further confirmed when we look at the proportion within 
each mortgage term in negative equity. Just over 17 per cent of those who took out a 20 
year mortgage are in negative equity. In contrast, nearly 88 per cent of borrowers who took 
out a mortgage with a term of between 31 and 35 years are now in negative equity. 
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Figure 6: Distribution of mortgages and negative equity by original mortgage term, % 
 
Source: Own estimates based on CSO data 
 
6. Who has Negative Equity 
Negative Equity and Buyer Type 
Micro-data allows us to examine the incidence of negative equity by type of buyer. The 
housing boom in Ireland lead to a diversity of buyer types beyond the traditional first-time 
buyer (FTB) and previous owner. For some joint loans, one applicant may be a FTB, while the 
other applicant may have already purchased a dwelling. In addition, there may be buyers 
who had previously owned but are now buying again, returning to home-ownership from a 
different tenure. In the above cases, these borrowers may have some equity to put towards 
the purchase of their property and so will be different to “new” FTBs. There were also 
assisted FTBs, those who benefited from assistance from a relative or third party, either 
direct financial assistance or indirectly through a joint mortgage or through the parent acting 
as guarantor. The need to take account of a greater range of buyer types is not unique to 
Ireland. For example, recent analysis by the Council of Mortgage Lenders (2011) in the UK 
distinguishes between first-time buyers and assisted first-time buyers. Based on our dataset 
the incidence of “assisted” FTBs is much lower than that of the UK, with just over 7 per cent 
of FTBs being formally identified as having received assistance via a joint mortgage or 
guarantor. Analysis of the loan level data shows that the mortgage characteristics of Assisted 
FTBs are very similar to “new” FTBs. For example, over the period, both new and assisted 
FTBs took out mortgages with an average term of approximately 31 years, while repeat 
buyers had a shorter average term of approximately 25 years. 
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The data shows that first-time buyers are more likely to be in negative equity, over 79 per 
cent of first-time buyers between 2005 and 2012. This compares to just over 47 per cent of 
previous owners. Joint applications where one of the borrowers is an FTB and the other is a 
previous owner are also likely to be in negative equity, just over 79 per cent, similar to first-
time buyers.  
Negative equity and Borrower Age 
There are concerns that the widespread negative equity is being experienced by young 
borrowers who had entered the housing market in the years immediately leading up to the 
house price peak. As the micro-data contains details of age at time of drawdown we are able 
to calculate the age of the borrower in 2012. Thus, Figure 7 shows the distribution of 
mortgages and the incidence of negative equity by the current age of the main borrower. 
Just over 63 per cent of those who took out a mortgage between 2005 and the end of 2012 
are now aged less than 40 years. These younger borrowers are much more likely to be 
experiencing negative equity, with 76 per cent affected, corresponding to two thirds of all 
permanent private households living in own accommodation with a mortgage or loan 
attached to it. They also account for almost 78 per cent of the total amount of negative 
equity accruing from mortgages for purchases of primary residences drawn down during the 
period under observation. 
 
Figure 7: Distribution of mortgages and negative equity by age in 2012, % 
 
Source: Own estimates based on CSO data 
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Regional distribution of negative equity 
Figure 8 shows the distribution of mortgages and negative equity by region. The 
distributions are closely aligned, suggesting that no particular region has been affected in 
adverse proportion to the share of mortgages in the region taken out between 2005 and 
2012, except perhaps Dublin which accounts for 24 per cent of mortgages, but 26.4 per cent 
of borrowers in negative equity. This contrasts with finding in the UK showing a strong 
geographic dimension to the incidence of negative equity (Purdey 2011). 
 Looking at the proportion of mortgages within a region that are in negative equity shows 
that for most regions over 60 per cent of the mortgages taken out between 2005 and 2012 
are now in negative equity, with Dublin the worst hit with over 70 per cent of mortgages 
from that period in negative equity. The region with the lowest proportion is the South 
West, with 58 per cent, although this still represents a very high proportion of mortgages.  
 
Figure 8: Distribution of mortgages and negative equity by region, % 
 
Source: Own estimates based on CSO data 
 
Depth of negative equity 
Much of the attention to date has been on those who are in negative equity, regardless of 
the depth of the negative equity. In Table 3 we show the extent of equity, both positive and 
negative, for those who took out their mortgage between 2005 and 2012. As before, 
approximately 64 per cent are in negative equity. Over 1 in five of mortgage borrowers since 
2005 is in negative equity that is above €75,000. In addition to those in negative equity, UK 
research suggests that there is another group to consider, those in “insufficient” equity 
(Thomas, 1996, Tatch, 2009). Mortgage borrowers in “insufficient” equity are still in positive 
equity but do not have sufficient positive equity to move house without borrowing 
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additional funds. Assuming a 10 per cent deposit requirement, and taking account of stamp 
duty, estate agency and legal fees, we estimate that these costs would amount to 
approximately €25,000. Based on these moving costs, we estimate that an additional 9.3 per 
cent of borrowers do not have sufficient funds to move house as the equity they hold is 
insufficient to finance a move, see Table 3. Analysis of the extent of negative equity by buyer 
type shows that, again, assisted FTBs show a distribution that is similar to new FTBs and 
markedly different to repeat buyers, with approximately one in three new or assisted FTBs in 
negative equity greater than €75,000, compared with 15 per cent of repeat buyers. 
 
Table 3: Housing equity, % of borrowers, 2005-2012 
 % 
Positive equity, >€75,000  14.9  
Positive equity, €50-75,000  5.1 
Positive equity, €25-50,000  6.5  
Positive equity, €0-25,000  9.3  
Negative equity, €0 to -€25,000  12.9  
Negative equity, -€25 to -€50,000  15.0  
Negative equity, -€50 to -€75,000  13.7  
Negative equity, >-€75,000  22.6  
Source: Own estimates based on CSO data 
 
Even though we have produced our estimate of the number in negative equity this estimate 
is dependent on the data we have and the assumptions we have made. Our estimate of 
approximately 214,000 mortgages in negative equity is based on data from 2005 to 2012. 
Kennedy and McIndoe-Calder (2011), also using loan level data find that nearly 90 per cent 
of mortgages in negative equity were taken out after 2005. If we assume a similar 
distribution then the total number of the mortgage stock in negative equity could be close to 
238,000.   
We have made the assumption that borrowers are making full payments, there are no 
arrears and borrowers have not released any equity from their property, as our dataset does 
not have information on the repayment history of borrowers. Research using an alternative 
loan level dataset for the Irish mortgage market shows that of the mortgage properties 
found to be in negative equity, 8 per cent had also accrued more than three months worth 
of arrears on their mortgage books, (Kennedy and McIndoe-Calder 2012). Central Bank data 
on mortgage restructuring shows that in December 2012, 79,852 mortgages had been 
restructured, 10.1 per cent of the total number of residential mortgage loans outstanding 
(Central Bank, 2013). Of these, the bulk had been restructured in such a way that the 
repayment of the outstanding principal is either temporarily suspended or occurs at a slower 
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pace, for example, moving to interest only repayment, a reduced payment, term extension, 
arrears capitalization, or a payment moratorium.  
 
7. Falling House Prices and Wealth Loss 
While the main focus of this paper is on the issue of negative equity the data allows us to 
draw attention to an additional, related issue. The occurrence of negative equity implies that 
a borrower has seen the value of their loan exceed any equity they might have. However the 
majority of mortgage financed transactions are not financed in full by the mortgage. An 
additional payment, often referred to as a deposit and constituting the difference between 
the transaction price and the mortgage, is also required.  Such payments can be funded via 
savings, equity release by the sale or remortgage of other property, gifts or non-mortgage 
borrowing. By taking account of these deposits (i.e. estimating the difference between 
current value and original purchase price rather than the outstanding mortgage principal) 
we can estimate the loss of wealth directly associated with falling residential property 
prices. The total loss amounts to just under €43 billion. Interestingly when we examine the 
distribution of loss by age we can see that it is more evenly distributed among age groups 
than negative equity, reflecting the lower loan to value ratios for mortgages drawn down by 
older borrowers. 
   
Table 4: Amount of wealth loss by age and year of drawdown (age is current age) 
 
under 
30 years 30-39 years 
40-49 
years 
50-59 
years 
60 plus 
years 
2005 -234  -4,341  -3,226  -1,202  -323 
2006 -693  -6,086  -3,739  -1,352  -304  
2007 -923  -5,135  -2,722  -1,069  -245  
2008 -863  -3,339  -1,608  -560 -126  
2009 -392  -1,130  -492  -161  -24  
2010 -233  -573  -244  -74  -8  
2011 -65  -170  -77 -19  -2   
2012 -4  -8  -4 -1  0   
Total -3,478 -21,191  -12,355  -4,535  -1,057 
      Distribution by 
age group 8.2 49.7 29.0 10.6 2.5 
Source: Own estimates based on CSO data 
 
8. Number of Households in Negative Equity 
Based on our sample we estimate that this amounts to approximately 214,000 mortgages, 
corresponding to 64 per cent of all primary residential mortgages taken out over the period 
and to 37 per cent of all permanent private households living in their own accommodation 
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with a mortgage or loan attached to it9. We estimate in turn, that these 214,000 mortgages 
had €14.3 billion of negative equity associated with them at the end of 2012.  
The publication of the Census 2011 volume The Roof over our Heads – Housing in Ireland 
allows us to provide an estimate of the number of households in negative equity by the age 
of the household reference person. Table 5 confirms the earlier finding that it is the younger 
age groups who are more likely to be experiencing negative equity. Close to 14 per cent of 
households where the head of household is aged under 30 years are in negative equity – 
these households account for just 6 per cent of households with a mortgage. In addition, 62 
per cent of households where the head of household is aged between 30 and 39 years are in 
negative equity, while these households account for 34 per cent of households with a 
mortgage. 
 
Table 5: Estimated number of households in negative equity 
 
Households 
% of 
Households 
Number in 
negative 
equity 
Distribution of 
Negative equity, 
mortgage drawn 
down post 2005 
All ages 
          
583,148  100 214,383 100 
<30 
             
36,501  6.3 29,543 13.8 
30-39 
          
200,106  34.3 133,121 62.1 
40-49 
          
195,056  33.4 42,167 19.7 
50-59 
          
110,712  19.0 8,255 3.9 
60 plus 
             
40,773  7.0 1,298 0.6 
 
  
                                                          
9 Census 2011 shows that there are 1,649,408 permanent private dwellings in Ireland, of which 
583,148 are owned with a mortgage or a loan. 
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9. Concluding Comments 
Using loan level data from the period 2005 to 2012 this paper provides an estimate for the 
proportion of these loans in negative equity. The analysis finds that, in common with the 
international evidence, the characteristics of the original mortgage (LTV ratio, mortgage 
term) are very important in determining if a borrower will experience negative equity as 
house prices start to fall.  
On the basis of the above analysis the situation in Ireland is much more severe than that 
being experienced in other housing market downturns at present. Recent analysis, (Purdey 
2011), finds that fewer than 8 per cent of those in the UK with a mortgage had some 
negative equity in the first quarter of 2011. However, house prices in the most of the UK did 
not experience as large a decline as in Ireland and there has been some recovery in UK 
house prices. The IMF (2012) report that the proportion of mortgage loans in negative 
equity in Iceland peaked at 38 per cent in 2010. In the United States it is estimated that 22.8 
per cent of residential properties with a mortgage were in negative equity at the end of the 
fourth quarter of 2011 (CoreLogic, 2012). Overall the numbers in negative equity in Ireland 
began to grow strongly from quarter 2, 2007, the period during which the CSO Residential 
Property Price Index shows its peak. We estimate that over 214,000 mortgages from the 
period 2005 to 2012 are in negative equity, approximately 37 per cent of households with a 
mortgage. While more recent data shows some stabilization in house prices, worries about 
the impact of and the depth of negative equity remain.  
Use of loan level data allows us to examine some of the characteristics of those in negative 
equity. What we find is that those first-time buyers who got assistance to purchase a 
dwelling during the boom have a similar experience of the depth of negative equity as FTBs 
who purchased without assistance. This reflects the fact that even with assistance that 
group of FTBs took out mortgages similar in characteristic to “new” FTBs. 
The wealth loss experienced by Irish households is substantial, estimated at almost €43 
billion, indicating that the impact of the price crash is much broader than negative equity. 
Households still in positive equity may also be experiencing effects similar to those in 
negative equity due to the loss in wealth. For example, they may feel the need to increase 
savings to compensate for the decline in equity. Data permitting this would be an interesting 
area for future research.  
The analysis finds the majority of those in negative equity aged under 40 years, with much of 
the wealth loss from the fall in house prices concentrated in the 30-39 year old age group.  
Traditionally, this is the age group that is active in the housing market, either buying their 
first property or trading within the market. With only moderate growth in house prices 
expected this suggests that there is a generation of mortgage borrowers whose experience 
of the housing market will have been overwhelmingly negative and who will remain in 
negative equity for some time.  
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Borrower   Loan Property  
   
Number of  Male Total Loan 
 
Price of Property 
Number of Female Month of 
 
Location NUTSIII 
Age of Main Loan Term New or Second Hand 
Age of Second Loan Type House or Apartment 
Gender Main Initial Gross IR   
Gender Second Rate Type  
Marital Status Main Years Fixed  
Marital Status Second  Means of funding 
 
 
Employment Status Main Other  Costs  
Employment Status Second   
Employment Sector Main   
Employment Sector Second   
Occupation Main   
Occupation Second   
Buyer Status Main   
Buyer Status Second   
Gross A Income Main    
Gross A Income Second     
Net M Income Main   
Net M Income Second   
Other Non Rental Income 
 
  
Other Non Rental Income 
 
  
Rental Income Main   
Rental Income Second   
Current Tenure Main   
Current Tenure Second   
Location NUTSIII Main   
Location NUTSIII Second   
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